

Politics of Talibanization in Pakistan

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General

End of the Cold War proved all the assumptions about the nature of the emerging international system proved wrong. Neither there was a “Clash of Civilization” nor an “End of History”. Sketch drawn by the political analysts about the future of international political system was based on their individual views. A key factor was ignored that henceforth international political system would be shaped by the world’s sole superpower. Thucydides said that power expands in the absence of a countervailing power. As it is the behaviour of every superpower that it wants to perpetuate its grip over the globe and take measures to contain the emergence of any other power.

The 9/11 event was not an ordinary one. It inflicted severe damage to the centres of US economic, political and military power. Long and clandestine planning of the attacks forced many to wonder, whether it was an opportunity given by the terrorists or created by US itself to pursue its hegemonic ambitions. The US legitimized its expedition for power under the veil of Global War on Terror (GWOT).

Al-Qaeda was formed during Afghan war in 1980s. With the passage of time it expanded its operational capabilities and network throughout the world. The 9/11 attack was not the first attempt by the Al-Qaeda to inflict damage on American interests but indeed it was a successful and vital

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blow. It is unimaginable that such an act of terrorism plotted by Al-Qaeda did not come in the knowledge of CIA. The US with a mammoth military budget which accounts 80% of the world's total military budget, was unable to dig out the conspiracy.

After the declaration of GWOT, US ambitions were miscalculated and misinterpreted by Pakistanis. Afghanistan was not the only abode of Taliban and Al-Qaeda. During the Afghan jihad Pakistan fully supported the Mujahideen. Even after the Afghan jihad these Mujahideen were used by Pakistan as a tool to further its interest in the region. Reportedly Pakistan's military intelligence had relations with the high profile leadership of Taliban. All these facts were open secret. The only thing which saved Pakistan from the initial anger of US was its nuclear capability and geographical importance. After nine years of war Pakistan's status is transforming from an ally to a target. Approximately 40 percent of supplies come from Pakistan for coalition forces operating in Afghanistan ("Pakistan reopen supply route for NATO forces," 2010). It was clear that US cannot overtly extend the GWOT to Pakistan's borders.

GWOT and Challenges to US

The GWOT is a manifestation of US hegemonic ambitions in the world. War initiated on the plea that the Taliban government, nurtured by US in the Cold War, is providing safe haven to the Al-Qaeda cadres. Primary objective of the US in this war is to destroy Al-Qaeda and Taliban. 9/11 attacks provoked US as never before. The Bush administration put a lot of pressure on Musharaf regime; as a result Pakistan offered its unequivocal support to US after 9/11 attacks. US took arms against the enemy (Taliban

and Al-Qaeda) which heretofore it has praised on dismantling Communist Soviet.

Trans-border Movement of Mujahideen: Border between Afghanistan and Pakistan is divided by the Durand line. There are Pashtun tribes living on both sides of the border. Movement on this border is unchecked and free. People living on the both sides of the border are tied together with kinship, marital relations and above all with the thread of Pashtun nationalism and concept of Muslim brotherhood. Therefore, territorial division did not affect them much. These Pashtuns resisted the British Army and the Red Army so there is an inherited animosity among them for the Westerners or the so-called “farangi”. The region which is administered by the federal government of Pakistan and is known as Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA), provided much of the manpower and training facilities during the Afghan Jihad.

When the US invaded Afghanistan it was clear that Taliban would receive support from the insurgents coming from Pakistan. These insurgents could be the veterans of Afghan Jihad concentrated in refugee camps of Pakistan, foreigners living in tribal areas, students of Pakistani madrassahs or the tribal Pashtuns. Pakistan was considered incompetent to stop the movement of these insurgents either due to its administrative weaknesses or for political purposes. Pakistan has the same perception of US presence in Afghanistan as it had of Soviet presence in Afghanistan during Cold War.

This situation led to the establishment of new priorities in US strategy, first, to stop all the physical support coming to help the Taliban, from Pakistani side, second, to restrict cross border movement of Taliban and Al-Qaeda cadres and third, to curb Al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda must not be allowed to settle in FATA and carryout its terrorist activities. Pressure was

exerted on Pakistan to stop the movement of the Taliban on Durand line. The US provided video evidences, showing the movement of Taliban from Afghanistan to FATA. It is questionable that drone attacks in FATA are rampantly carried out by US but when it comes to trans-border movement of Taliban, US instead of taking tangible actions to restrain movement, rely on evidence and a consistent demand from Pakistan to do more.

Detachment of Pakistan Army: Beside Pakistan's pledge to provide maximum support in GWOT, it refused to become a part of the Allied military campaign. Since 9/11, it was the top priority of US to crush Al-Qaeda and exterminate Taliban. To eliminate Al-Qaeda and Taliban it was necessary to crush them from both sides i.e. from Afghanistan by NATO forces and from Pakistan's tribal region by Pakistan Army. A porous border provided the notorious elements to inflict damage on Allies and find safe havens in FATA. Although through tacit consent of Pakistan, US is carrying drone attacks but the results are not much fruitful as it would have been if there was a full fledged military operation (Murphy, 2009). Question was how to involve the Pakistan military in the ongoing GWOT. There were no such movements as Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Muhammadi (TNSM) or one carried out by Lal Masjid's clerics or Pakistani Taliban before 2005. Even when animosity against US was at peak after the invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq, nothing stirred the mullahs in Pakistan to raise weapons against their own country. But suddenly after 2005, TTP emerged and Pakistan was hit by a wave of suicide blasts and terrorist attacks. Security agencies, especially army and the police, were the main targets of these blasts. Analysts consider the possibility of US intelligence plot behind the creation of TTP to provoke the Pakistan to launch a full scale operation in Waziristan in general and delink its sympathy to Taliban in Afghanistan in particular (Javed, 2010). These

suspicions about US behaviour are further strengthened by the fact that while Pakistan army was initiating a military operation against militants in South Waziristan in 2009, the US forces vacated eight check posts from the other side of the border. Evacuation allowed Taliban to move into Pakistan from Afghanistan and fight against Pakistan's Army (Quddisia, 2009). Instead of bolstering the Pakistan's efforts, US provided a safe passage to the Taliban.

Concerns of Pakistani Government: India and Pakistan have competing strategic agendas in Afghanistan over the last seven decades. Pakistan enjoyed cordial relations with the Taliban government and its western border was safe as it was never before in history. After 9/11 Pakistan was forced to take a u-turn on its Afghanistan policy on the face of US ultimatum- *Either you are with us or against us*. Once US entered into Afghanistan things changed for Pakistan. Indian involvement increased in Afghanistan. In this situation Pakistan had to defend its own interest rather than pursuing that of US. Pakistan sees Afghanistan as part of a threatening Indian movement, to fuel Pashtun separatism inside Pakistan. According to Richard Holbrooke:

“Afghanistan is a classic power vacuum; neighbours see it as point of instability to guarantee their own stability or an opportunity to score points.”

US Goals

1. *Spoiling the Image of Taliban:* The Taliban were regarded with great respect after they had successfully established a just society. It was thought at that time that Muslims would lend support to the Taliban because of their religiosity. These sentiments were more pervasive in Pakistani

society than any other Muslim country. The US objective was to spoil the image of Taliban. The policy of US, in this regard, was to make the Pakistanis think as all the people of the world are thinking about the Taliban. Talibanization in Pakistan will change the public opinion and would legitimize the possible operations from the NATO forces.

2. *Demonization of Pakistan:* Demonization of a state prior to military operation is an important aspect of psychological warfare. Beside the fact that Pakistan is a US ally and has given sacrifices more than what coalition forces have endured jointly, still US, its allies and their media consistently blames Pakistan for supporting Taliban and not doing more. A propaganda war has been initiated against Pakistan. There can be three possible objectives of US for commencing this demonization campaign.

- First, to shape the domestic public opinion in order to gain support for a possible large scale military intervention in Pakistan.
- Second legitimize any future military intervention in Pakistan.
- Third, to intervene in Pakistan for securing the nuclear weapons and fissile material (Almeida, 2010).

As Pakistan is an ally, therefore, it was not possible for US to exceed from UN mandate and carry out operations in Pakistan's territory. Policy of demonization was carried through three components: First, scepticism about Pakistan's support in GWOT. Secondly, possible danger of falling of WMD into the hands of Al-Qaeda and thirdly Pakistan's alleged support to Taliban.

The US is looking for a face-saving withdrawal from Afghanistan and for this it is now trying to negotiate a deal with the Taliban. Later events shed some doubt on this American stance. Earlier, when Pakistan signed a deal

with Mullah Fazlullah in Swat, a storm of propaganda was unleashed by the Western media. A story with the title “Taliban are now just 60 miles away from Islamabad” was published in *The New York Times*. Exaggeration of threat was the part of demonization campaign to change the public opinion.

Obama declared nuclear terrorism as an ultimate threat to US. Many US officials have repeatedly said that terrorists will try to acquire these weapons. But from where terrorists will acquire these weapons? They have only one answer, Pakistan. Image created about Pakistan is that its nuclear programme is extremely vulnerable to terrorists. Scepticism about the Pakistan’s support has pervaded in US. According to Wikileaks Pakistan has been repeatedly accused in US documents for helping Taliban. Beside hundreds of Al-Qaeda and Taliban leaders were handed over to US but still its officials, its media and allies insist that sanctuaries have been provided to them by Pakistan. Demonization enabled the US to carryout its operations in FATA more vigorously.

Pakistani Taliban

The FATA is a region in the west of Pakistan which is mainly inhabited by Pashtuns. FATA is divided into seven agencies and in past it was referred as “illaqa-e-ghair” (No man’s land) due to political, economic and social denial of the region by the government. Government writ in the area was feeble which provided ideal grounds for the breeding of terrorism and extremism. Due to the lack of educational institutions, only available source of learning with the people of FATA were madrassahs. These madrassahs were run by religious clerics. This situation was exploited by these clerics and they promoted Islamic extremism and fundamentalism in this region.

Factors in Rise of Pakistani Taliban: People living in Tribal areas were initially providing sanctuaries to the Taliban and Mujahideen. They were sympathetic to them and their cause. Pashtuns are famous for their hospitality and arrival of guest is considered an honour. After the US invasion of Afghanistan when all the Taliban and Al-Qaeda fugitives came for safe havens in this area, they were very warmly received by the tribal people. The US was successful in occupying Afghanistan on the other hand fugitives were successful to find safe havens in FATA. These fugitives included not only Pashtun Taliban but also Arabs, Tajiks, Uzbeks and other foreigners who were part of Al-Qaeda. These Al-Qaeda members plotted conspiracies to slay Musharraf. (“Key al-Qaeda Leader Involved in Musharraf’s Assassination Attempt Arrested,” 2005) To contain foreign elements, a limited military operation was initiated in some agencies of FATA. When Pakistan Army commenced its operations in FATA in search of foreigners, some militant groups resisted. Initially these military operations were aimed to eliminate foreigners from the area. Majority joined hands with military and raised arms against the foreigners. Among the foreigners Uzbeks and Arabs were in majority and former were the main target. Main hurdle in conducting a successful military operation was the reservation of Pakistan vis-a- vis Taliban. An operation to eliminate Taliban from FATA was never wholeheartedly launched by Pakistan. Pakistan considers the Taliban card important for playing a powerful role in post-American Afghanistan. Operations were conducted to uproot “bad” Taliban and Al-Qaeda members that were acting against the ideology, sovereignty and integrity of Pakistan. It would have been easier to stop the Talibanization in FATA had Pakistan taken a strong

military action against Islamic militants at a time when they were gaining prominence.

Relation between Pakistan and Taliban is an open secret. After 9/11, Pakistan wanted that US should negotiate with the Taliban instead of opting for a military campaign. After the US invasion, Pakistan tried to pursue Mullah Omar to soften his stance so that US may show its willingness to involve the Taliban in a political process. Pakistan was trying to reduce the strain that it foresaw when a pro-Indian Northern Alliance would be ruling Afghanistan. Due to stubborn attitude of the Mullah Omar, it was decided in Pakistan that he should be replaced so measures were initiated to split the Taliban alliances. Jalalud din Haqqani was asked to plot a coup against Mullah Omar and replace him as leader of the Taliban (Saleem, 2007). Under the umbrella of Hezb-i Islami, Haqqani had earlier resisted, Soviet army and became prominent. After the emergence of Taliban, he owed his loyalty to Mullah Omar and during his rule served as governor of Paktia province. Pakistani establishment tried to use Mullah Dadullah but he was killed in a military raid by Allied forces. Taliban were aware of the developments and knew that Pakistan wanted to overthrow Omar by using Dadullah (Saleem, 2007). Higher echelon of the Taliban tried to cash the sympathies on the other side of the Durand life. The TTP was created with the consent of Mullah Omar although the Taliban are denying their links with TTP. It was a warning, that any move to make rifts in Taliban movement will be met with retaliatory response. On request of Mullah Omar, Baitullah Mehsud, Mullah Nazir and Hafiz Gul Bahadur, top leaders of Taliban movement in Pakistan, met in February 2009, put aside their differences and announced that Mullah Omar as their supreme leader. Pakistani Taliban are Mullah Omar's "knife held at Islamabad's throat" (Claudio, 2009).

On June 18, 2004 US carried out its first drone attack in the Pakistani territory. Nek Muhammad was killed in this attack in Wana, South Waziristan. US drone strikes till to-date have killed 2,210 people (New America Foundation, 2011). Pakistani government avoided a strong reaction to condemn these attacks and had not taken tangible steps to stop them. These attacks were exasperating people of FATA and ambiguous stance of Pakistan further aggravated this situation. These attacks changed the perception of the tribal people, they now came to believe that Pakistan first aligned itself with the infidel against an Islamic state and is now reluctant to stop the drone attacks. In this situation, tribal affiliations that were prevailing in different factions fighting against government were cloaked by religious ideology.

One important development in this regard was the Lal Masjid saga that ended with a military operation. Militants had given threats before and after the operation (“Al-Qaeda issues Pakistan threat,” 2007).[‡] Lal Masjid clerics were Deobandi and were ideologically close to the Taliban. After the Lal Masjid operation, militancy took a drastic shape. Military operation impelled the sufferers to adopt militancy. Those students, who survived the operation, along with the relatives of the slain students, joined militant groups. This operation was seen by the public as a brutal act against the religious students. In KPK atrocities of operation were exaggerated by the religious clerics in sermons. To expel their narcissistic rage many joined militant organization.

Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP): Immanuel Kant said, “Justice is categorical imperative”. How had the Taliban managed to gain the

[‡] “Al-Qaeda issues Pakistan threat,” *BBC*, July 11, 2007, accessed October 18, 2010, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/6293914.stm

loyalties of the local people? It was cheap justice that they delivered in a short time; justice, which government of Pakistan had failed to deliver. “Taliban Commandos” was a force formed by Baitullah Mehsud to establish Taliban type of law and order in FATA. Thieves and criminals were arrested and then prosecuted in public. On same patterns and with same objectives, Mullah Fazlullah of TNSM established a shariah court and a “Shaheen Commandos” force in Swat. Local people frustrated of government’s ability to solve their petty problems, welcomed the Taliban. A landmark in the development of TTP was the 2004 military operation in Kalosha, where Naik Muhammad, a former old hand of Taliban in Soviet Jihad, resisted militarily. Initially militants resisted mainly in few agencies of FATA but they expanded and shifted from the local tribal militant groups to an organized united movement. This movement, latter culminated in the form of TTP in December 2007, under the leadership of Baitullah Mehsud. TTP was mainly concentrated in North and South Waziristan but its aim was to build a single entity from along the border of South Waziristan up to the Bajaur Agency. Twenty six factions of Taliban from different agencies of FATA joined TTP.

The TTP is organizational grouping of Taliban sympathizers in Pakistan. Rogue groups that were working in FATA began to replace the prevailing “jirga” system. They exploited people on religious grounds and killed 200 tribal leaders under the charges of being anti-Islamic and pro-American (Hassan 2007). They extended their sphere of operation in different parts of the country. Suicide attacks were rampant. Security forces were main target of these attacks. After initial reluctance, government of Pakistan, at different times, entered into peace agreements with the Taliban. These agreements failed to give any positive results as both the sides time and again violated the terms and conditions of the peace agreements. Despite

the failure of these agreements security agencies got ample time to plan operations in the affected areas. Reconnaissance was increased which earlier was weak. Intelligence agencies penetrated in the ranks of Taliban and worked as Trojan horses in the military operations.

There is another side of the picture, India. India is behind the current and past turmoil in Pakistan. India is supporting Taliban. Indian influence has increased in Afghanistan. In Bonn Conference India promised \$750 million for reconstruction and humanitarian relief in Afghanistan. Indian engineers are engaged in construction of roads, 200 military personnel are present to give security to Indians present in Afghanistan. Due to India's historical animosity towards Pakistan, it is definitely involved in supporting militants in Pakistan. Shape to the TTP was given by the domestic events and regional developments but India helped to institutionalize this threat. Security agencies in Pakistan arrested a 20 years boy from Wah Cantt who came for a suicide attack. On investigation it was revealed that RAW and Afghan intelligence agencies are backing the mayhem commenced by the Taliban ("Taliban backed by RAW trained Wah bombers," 2008). This attack was among many attacks that were carried out by the Taliban during 2008. All the terrorist activities that TTP carried out in Pakistan showed that they were well-trained for these acts. After the Swat Operation top leaders of Taliban were arrested. They "confessed that they had been provided financial aid, weapons and special training by secret agencies from India, including RAW and Afghanistan to fight against Pakistan's security forces" (India, Afghanistan supporting militants in Pakistan," 2009). Pakistan's foreign minister, Shah Mehmood Qureshi in an interview categorically said that Pakistan was "compiling hard evidence of India's involvement and interference in Balochistan and FATA" ("Qureshi accuses India of aiding insurgents," 2009). Rehman

Malik, interior minister of Pakistan also condemned India on adopting a hypocritical behaviour. He said that, “We have solid evidence that not only in Balochistan but India is involved in almost every terrorist activity in Pakistan” (“India behind most terror attacks, says Malik,” 2009). Malign Talibanization was nurtured by India in fragile FATA. Recently Wikileaks disclosed US embassy cables. In one of the cable PM Gillani informed US senator about Pakistan’s reservation regarding the strong Indian presence in Afghanistan. Indian interference in Balochistan and other parts of the Pakistan is undermining Pakistan’s ability to actively employ its military against the terrorists in FATA (Anwar, 2010). After Mumbai attacks, India vociferously alleged Pakistan of supporting terrorism but it is itself involved in supporting terrorism to undermine the credibility and sovereignty of Pakistan.

The TTP’s ideology was based on jihad which it carried out on the both sides of the Durand line. Only thing that lacked was funding, weapons and training, here they sought help from India and Afghanistan. After getting these capabilities TTP became highly dangerous. About 150,000 coalition forces are present in Afghanistan and still Afghan territory is being used against Pakistan; most important ally of the US in GWOT (Robert, 2011). US silence on the allegations made by Pakistan against India for its support of Taliban is eroding the understanding between the two countries. The TTP carried out its terrorist activities in different parts of Pakistan but it was mainly concentrated in KPK. Majority of militants in the TTP were Pashtuns. Recently another wing of Taliban has emerged which is termed as Punjabi Taliban. During Zia’s rule sectarianism was promoted under the supervision of state agencies. Institutionalization of militancy was hallmark of Zia regime. Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) and Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) were created to contain the effects of Iranian Revolution on

Shiite population of Pakistan. These organizations were anti-Shiite in stance. President Musharaf, during his address to the nation in 2002, categorically mentioned that extremism was a great internal threat to Pakistan's security. He banned LeJ and SSP along with other militant organizations. These groups were ideologically close to the Taliban as they had stemmed from Deobandi school of thought. Despite this ban these organizations continued their anti-Shiite activities and used to seek refuge in FATA. Some members of these organizations shifted their loyalties and adhered to Taliban. They became important collaborators of Taliban. They are supporting Taliban elements from Pakistan's tribal regions to conduct attacks in major cities of Pakistan. As they were more educated, developed in technology and had ability to amalgamate in the Punjabi society, they proved explosive. Some members of these organizations had confessed that they carried out terrorist attacks in Pakistan and have recruited people from metropolises and gave them training in Miranshah and Waziristan to fight Pakistan military (Faraz, 2009).

Punjabi Taliban are distinct from TTP in their nature and working. They lack an organizational structure and a hierarchy of leadership. They work as a branch of Taliban. LeJ and SSP are not Punjabi Taliban, the term is specifically attributed to the individuals who have broken away from their parent organizations and are working with the Taliban (Hassan, 2009).

The Politics of Talibanization: Throughout its history military establishment in Pakistan has played a pivotal role in setting the policy objective at international as well as at domestic level. Talibanization "is a result of the state's flirtation with militancy as a foreign policy tool" (Moeed, 2010). Creation of extremist organizations like LeJ and SSP by the military was aimed to sustain the military's

influence in politics. Security agencies under military had established cordial relations with clerics. These relations had a twofold agenda. First, to keep the general public engaged in inter-sectarian rifts through these clerics in order to impede their active participation in politics. Second, these clerics through their decrees would provide legitimacy to military rule in case military toppled down an elected government. At international level organizations like LeJ, Jaish-e-Muhammad, Harkat-ul-Mujahideen and Harkat-ul-Ansar, are used as insurgencies to mount pressure on India. Here religious clerics provide manpower by recruiting the citizens through their call for jihad. These objectives of military hamper the efforts for the elimination of militancy from Pakistan. Military ignores the fact that Taliban have emerged as one of the greatest threat to the integrity of Pakistan. To perpetuate its influence, military is still insisting that India is the greatest threat and has deployed 80% of its forces on Pakistan's eastern border instead of mobilizing them to eradicate Taliban (Ahmed, 2010). It has adopted the stance of 1971, where continued insistence of Indian involvement led to negligence to address core internal problems which consequently resulted in fragmentation of the country. A senior intelligence official, Dr Peter Lavoy, told a meeting of NATO allies in November 2008 that:

“The ISI allowed the Taliban's Quetta Shura leadership council to operate unfettered in Balochistan, while it provided the Waziristan-based Haqqani network with intelligence and financial support to conduct attacks in Afghanistan against Afghan government, Isaf and Indian targets ... Pakistan continues to define India as its number one threat and insists that India plays an overactive role in Afghanistan.” (Declan, 2010)

The Pakistan military is so much paranoid by the Indian threat that General Ashfaq Kayani explicitly said that, “the Pakistani establishment will dramatically increase support for Taliban groups in Pakistan and Afghanistan, which they see as ... an important counterweight” (Declan, 2010).

Military is stuck in the dilemma of “good” Taliban and “bad” Taliban. According to US embassy cables, Pakistan military is supporting four major militant groups including the Afghan Taliban. Military ignore the fact that future Afghanistan, solely ruled by Taliban is neither acceptable to Allies nor to its neighbours except Pakistan. On the other hand if a military operation is carried out to uproot extremism and militancy in FATA, it will not only increase Indian influence in the Afghanistan but would undermine the hegemony of military in Pakistan. Emphasizing the Indian threat is meant to extort military aid from US and to keep the myth of Indian threat alive to the Pakistanis. Former US ambassador to Pakistan, Anne Patterson very rightly pointed to the fact in one of the cable by saying that “there is no chance that Pakistan will view enhanced assistance... as sufficient compensation for abandoning support to these groups, which it sees as an important part of its national security apparatus against India”(“WikiLeaks: Pak won’t abandon terror groups,” 2011). Due to military priorities and its strategic interests, Pakistan will not conduct a full-scale operation against militants. Its policy of supporting “good” Taliban and crushing “bad” Taliban will continue.

The US has broader objectives in the region which are yet covered with the dust of time. These objectives may be economic, containment of China, exploitation of the energy resources in the region or some other. The US wants stability in Afghanistan to install its neo-imperial version as

it did in Iraq, by creating conducive environment for its 50,000 military through couple of agreements that it has concluded with Iraqi government (A.G. Noorani, 2010). It is likely that US will pullout some of its forces but will maintain its control through client regimes.

Domestic pressure is increasing on US to bring the Afghan expedition to an end. Paramount challenge which US face in this regard is the dual role of Pakistan's military and ISI. Recent US embassy cables unveiled by Wikileaks clearly indicate the frustration of US and the fact that they are getting tired of Pakistan's double game. Before the visit of General Ashfaq Kyani to US, Anne Patterson wrote to the Washington that "the biggest single message Kayani should hear in Washington is that this support must end" ("Treasury Department acts against members of terrorist group," 2011).

Due to the fear of expansion of war US is reluctant to directly intervene in Pakistan. The US presence in Afghanistan is intolerable for Pakistan. To stabilize Afghanistan and pursue its broader goals in the region, it is widely believed that US is gradually shifting the GWOT into Pakistan but until Pakistan's nuclear assets are seized, prospects of carrying a direct military operation against militants in Pakistan's territory are bleak. The real target is Pakistan's nuclear potential, argues A.R. Jerral (2010); a leading analyst, "They have no plausible security threat from the ill-equipped Talibans or ragtag extremist(sic)". US has embarked on a policy to destabilize Pakistan. US is interested in perpetuating a state of 'controlled chaos' in Pakistan (Cyril, 2010). Talibanization of Pakistan best serve this goal of US. President Zardari alleged US of supporting the Pakistani Taliban for arranging the attacks inside Pakistan (Bob, 2010). Through India and Afghanistan, US is providing indirect support to the Pakistani Taliban. US is doing the same what it did in Balochistan by

supporting Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) through UK (Michel, 2010). A secret war has been commenced in Pakistan by CIA. When it becomes impossible for CIA politically or militarily, to launch a direct U.S. operation, then it trains, equips and funds local proxy forces to achieve its goals. Bob Woodward, in his book *Obama's Wars* has termed this as "retribution plan" (Bob, 2010).

US leverage to Taliban in past and Pakistan's current support to Taliban reflects that both the countries are pursuing their own motives. Despite having a nuclear umbrella, cost of provoking US would be high for Pakistan. Pakistan "could end up as the scapegoat in a failed war, with potentially disastrous consequences for the country" (Peter, 2010). The process of creation and elimination of Taliban manifests the interest of both the countries. Politics of Talibanization is at the heart of GWOT.

Conclusion

GWOT was initiated by US to wipe out Al-Qaeda and Taliban. Pakistan's support for success in this war was mandatory. US extorted Pakistan's support through a policy of carrot and stick. US successfully toppled down the Taliban government. In 2006 there was a resurgence of Taliban movement. It is believed by US that these Taliban in initial attacks sought refuge in tribal areas of Pakistan and later with the help of ISI used FATA as a base to carryout operations against Allied forces in Afghanistan. US was not satisfied with the support given by Pakistan and emphasized that Pakistan should carry out military operation against Taliban and militants within its territory. A demonization campaign was commenced against Pakistan through which US legitimized extension of GWOT from Afghanistan to FATA.

Beside the fact that Allied and Pakistani forces were present at the both sides of the Durand line yet they failed to stop the trans-border movement

of Taliban. Conflicting interests and lack of coordination between the Allies provided opportunity to the Taliban to carry out their activities more vigorously. Being sympathetic to Taliban, Pakistan's inability to contain movement of Taliban is explicable but reasons as why Allied forces failed to impede this movement, are dubious.

Local militant groups that were initially supporting Taliban detracted from their Pakistan friendly ideology and took arms against their own state. Anti-Pakistan Taliban movements which emerged in FATA jolted the security situation in Pakistan. It became inevitable for Pakistan to launch military operations. Division among the ranks of Taliban deeply affected US GWOT. Both US and Pakistan have lost confidence on each other.

Situation further aggravated when US announced a bleak time frame for its withdrawal from Afghanistan. Pakistan is obsessed with the fact that prolonged stay of US will strengthen Indian position in Afghanistan. To maintain influence in politics of post-American Afghanistan, Pakistan refrained military operations to anti-Pakistan Taliban only. Pakistan is believed to be supporting anti-American Taliban. On the other hand, in Pakistan it is widely believed that US has some role in ongoing terrorism in Pakistan.

Talibanization in Pakistan is a complex phenomenon. Broader objectives of both US and Pakistan are not clear, this vague situation is creating opportunities for India to intrude and take full benefit of unfelt rift between Pakistan and America. India is seeking ways to have permanent stay in the region from where it could keep an eye on Pakistan, China and Central Asian States at the same time.

Talibanization has disastrous consequences for Pakistan's society and economy. If Pakistan continued its policy of supporting Taliban, in future real threats to its security will come from a quartet formed of Pakistani

Taliban, Afghanistan, India and US. It would be almost impossible for the military to fight at domestic as well as at international level with the rivals, it is no match for.

Two pillars of US foreign policy, security and promotion of economic interests, are at odds while dealing with India and Pakistan. Indo-US nexus is disturbing the BoP in the South Asia. The US must satisfy Pakistani concerns regarding Indian presence in Afghanistan. Nuclear arsenal of Pakistan makes it impossible for the US to bomb it like Cambodia. To avoid defeat, the US must change its policy towards India. A major shift in the US policy can bring Pakistan's dual role to an end and pave the way for its success.

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